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"In a world wrought with dramatic technological change,
holding onto the past is an impossible task. To the extent that
the FBI is seeking to keep electronic communications in the
postcard era, its efforts cannot succeed. The genie is out of the
bottle; it cannot be put back in."1
i. Introduction
A. The Speed of Technological Advances Poses Legal Challenges
It is hard not to take for granted the headlong pace at which
emerging technologies are reshaping our ideas of what is possible.
Virtual reality, artificial intelligence, the Internet, the information
superhighway and more, once the stuff of science fiction, are now
readily accessible concepts to most Americans. The emergence and
use of new technologies create legal problems which at times
require novel legal responses. The current information revolution
implicates issues ranging from personal privacy to economic
competitiveness. Electronic technology has allowed the develop-
ment of devices and equipment that substantially improve the
quality of our lives. This technology has been a critical component
of the drastic improvements in transportation, manufacturing,
communications, medicine, art, entertainment and finance.
Beyond the commercial realities driving this area of technol-
ogy, the government itself has recognized the value of fostering and
harnessing the fruits of the information revolution. The Clinton
Administration has made the promotion of the National Informa-
tion Infrastructure (NII) one of its public initiatives. The concept
is to accelerate the development of the existing infrastructure and
to facilitate the transfer of information for research and education,
as well as to make commerce more electronically friendly.' As the
very way people conceptualize commerce, government, education
and entertainment is transformed by emerging information
1. The Threat of Foreign Economic Espionage to U.S. Corporations: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Economic and Commercial Law, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 245 (1992)
[hereinafter The Threat of Eoreign Economic Espionage] (statement of Dr. Nathan P.
Myhrvold, Vice President, Advanced Technology and Business Development, Microsoft
Corp.).
2. See Patrick J. Leahy, New Laws For New Technologies: Current Issues Facing the
Subcommittee on Technology and the Law, HARV. J.L. & TEcH., Spring 1992, at 1, 2.
3. Graeme Browning, Search for Tomorrow, 25 NAT'L J. 674 (1993).
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technologies, governments will be under severe time pressures to
reconfigure the legal system to keep pace.
B. The Challenge of Legal Responses is Especially Salient for
Law Enforcement
One sector of society that has not taken technological
advancement for granted is America's law enforcement agencies.
Capabilities, which once were captured only in the fanciful mind's
eye of James Bond script writers, are now often at the disposal of
federal, state and local law enforcement agencies. The computer
age has brought national fingerprint banks, criminal history banks,
DNA technologies and much more.
New ways of ordering society, however, necessarily implicate
new possibilities for crime. For example, a conservative estimate
by the Department of Commerce indicates that telecommunications
and electronic transfer crimes alone exceed $1 billion a year.4
Beyond opportunities for new types of crimes, advancing
technologies have also diluted the ability of law enforcement agents
to carry out crucial investigations. The exercise of effective
wiretaps is, for example, one such area where law enforcement
capabilities are vulnerable just when such capabilities are most
important. Because the market economy of tomorrow is almost
totally electronic, more and more crimes will utilize the telephone
lines. New technologies and services such as encryption of data,
call forwarding, cellular telephony and fiber optics have created
difficulties for the use of wiretaps to interdict crime. This evolution
of telecommunications technology is making it increasingly difficult
for meaningful law enforcement interception of communications
pursuant to a court authorized wiretap.'
C. Overview: Evaluation of Three Government Initiatives to
Develop Some General Lessons for Future Policy Solutions
This Article examines one area where law enforcement has
encountered significant technological troubles to develop some
general observations about how government policies to deal with
4. Hearing on H.R. 1900, Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act of 1993: Hearing
before the Subcommittee on Labor-Management Relations of the Committee on Education and
Labor, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 159 (1993) (prepared report of Scott C. Ehrlich, Employment
Policy Foundation).
5. William S. Sessions, The FBI Needs Industry's Help, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 27, 1992, at
1996]
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similar emerging challenges can be successfully crafted. Specifical-
ly, this Article will discuss the troubles with which law enforcement
agencies have had to contend in effecting meaningful wiretaps, as
well as the federal government's responses to this problem. It is
crucial to study new technologies in order to evaluate the law's
ability to keep pace with them and respond to their unique
characteristics.
This Article, utilizing recent examples in telecommunications,
paints in broad strokes the increasing difficulties that law enforce-
ment agencies will continue to face as the technological revolution
burgeons. The very structural configuration by which communica-
tions are being sent is making legitimate government wiretapping
difficult, if not impossible. The implications of undetectable
criminal activity, along with the specter of terrorism within our very
borders, make this problem one of utmost concern. Policy makers
must attend to the legal problems created by new technologies and
the special legal responses that these technologies might require.
Hopefully, a look into this problem, however cursory, will help us
consider how to formulate meaningful legal responses to future law
enforcement problems. The exploration of current policy tensions
arising from the legal responses to the wiretap problem illustrates
that legal approaches should fit the technology and regulated
players.
II. Importance of the Topic
A. Changes in the Nature and Use of Telecommunications have
Greatly Increased Electronic Communications' Social Import
Business, as well as society itself, is becoming more global.
Advancing in stride with business is the utilization of electronic
communications. For example, the average number of electronic
point-of-sale transactions in the U.S. went from 38 per day in 1985
to 1.2 million per day in 1993.6 The figure displayed below
illustrates the rapid acceleration of information flow over the
Internet. By 1993, the Internet carried approximately thirty-five
billion packets of information per month.
6. U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, INFORMATION SECURITY
AND PRIVACY IN NETWORK ENVIRONMENTS, OTA-TCT-606 1-2 (1994) [hereinafter OTA-
TCT-606].
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Communications using all media are becoming more important,
while at the same time spanning jurisdictions with questionable
integrity. The very nature of electronic communications exposes
them to interception far more easily than their paper counterparts.
More information in daily life is being computerized using more
public lines and databases. This concentration of information, both
in endpoint and medium, compounds the threats of misuse and
misappropriation of information by third parties and government
itself. Industrial data bases are vulnerable to espionage from
foreign sources. Even at the domestic level, the emergence of new
technologies, like caller-ID,7 has brought to focus how new
technologies implicate our ability to control personal information.
As the world becomes increasingly interconnected through
technology, maintaining control over the privacy of our lives will
become a more challenging task. Networking of information has
greatly increased due to a number of key developments.' By the
turn of the century, every firm will be using the state of the art
telecommunications services provided through a public-switched
network.9 Additionally, the federal government plans to use
networks in order to make government more efficient, effective and
responsive. 0 However, the more information we turn over to the
7. See, e.g., Mary Nagelhout, Caller ID: Privacy and Blocking Issues, PUBL. UTIL.
FORT., Mar. 1, 1992, at 31.
8. These developments include: an overall movement to distributed computing where
mainframes are at the center of systems, costs for access to computer power have dropped
incredibly, the number and variety of services providers have increased, computer networks
are now more interactive, and information technology has created electronic commerce which
has transformed and created industries. OTA-TCT-606, supra note 6, at 3-4.
9. See The Threat of Foreign Economic Espionage, supra note 1, at 122 (statement of
James E. Riesbeck, Executive Vice President, Coming Inc.).
10. See INFORMATION INFRAsTRucruRE TASK FORCE, THE NATIONAL INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCrURE: AGENDA FOR ACTION (1993).
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firms with which we do business and to our governments, the more
susceptible we are to the misuse of that very information.
In fact, the threats to Americans are not limited to typical
domestic crimes. The scope of economic espionage conducted by
foreign governments is a growing and important phenomenon.
Ample evidence exists that, inter alia, the KGB, the French
government and the Israeli government have utilized surveillance
spying technology to misappropriate U.S. corporate secrets;"
state-sponsored threats are also known to originate from the
Japanese, Swedes, Swiss, Chinese, British and the former Soviet
client states,12 although the precise scope of economic espionage
is difficult to calculate because the FBI and CIA view such
information as classified. 3
At the same time that some characteristics of the information
revolution threaten our privacy, other emerging technologies
promise to help ameliorate the new problems associated with the
mass transfer and storage of personal and business data. Electronic
cryptography has become an essential instrument for safeguarding
information from unauthorized interception. 4 Global commerce
is becoming more automated, thus, the need for encryption is great.
Because more business is conducted electronically, 5 the incentive
to snoop is enormous. Knowledge and instruments for constructing
interception equipment are readily available and very inexpen-
sive.16 Advances in encryption technology have made it possible
for industry to protect its most sensitive business information by
effectively scrambling data. Currently, American firms are able to
send encrypted product, design and engineering information across
11. The Threat of Foreign Economic Espionage, supra note 1, at 7-8 (statement of
Miltron J. Socolar, Special Assistant to the Comptroller General, GAO).
12. Id. at 19 (statement of Gerald S. Burke, expert consultant to industry).
13. Id. at 17 (statement of Miltron J. Socolar, Special Assistant to the Comptroller
General, GAO).
14. A 1993 survey of Fortune 500 Companies found that 92.1% of respondents felt that
"information security was very important for their company," and 46.4% "believed that data
encryption was important to protect the security and confidentiality of information in
addition to passwords and access control." FROST & SULLIVAN, INC., THE DEMAND FOR
INFORMATION SECURITY AND ENCRYPTION IN FORTUNE 500 COMPANIES IN THE UNITED
STATES 3-4 (1993).
15. One set of valuable communications increasing in frequency are the trade secrets
of businesses being electronically transmitted. The Threat of Foreign Economic Espionage,
supra note 1, at 287 (statement of Addison M. Fischer, President, Fischer International
Systems Corp.).
16. Id. at 286.
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international telecommunications networks with little fear that
eavesdropping competitors may steal it. Likewise, digital signatures
utilize cryptography in order to electronically authenticate commer-
cial transactions like purchase orders, tax returns and fund
transfers. But while serving to protect users from interception
risks, this very technology may make it more difficult to control
some types of crime.
B. Importance of Effective Wiretaps
1. Electronic Surveillance Has Been A Resounding
Success.-Law enforcement officials have consistently argued that
electronic surveillance is an essential law enforcement tool to
ensure the public safety. 7 In the ten year period ending in 1992,
according to testimony on the part of FBI agent James Kallstrom,
more than 22,000 convictions have resulted from court-authorized
surveillances."i The ratio of convictions to number of wiretaps
utilized19 shows that this prudently used investigatory technique is
one of the strongest weapons in the war against crime. Further-
more, in a time when worldwide terrorism is at the highest level in
American history,2 the need for electronic surveillance is, per-
haps, also at its greatest.
21
17. COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, THE DIGITAL TELEPHONY BILL OF 1994, S. REP.
NO. 402, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1994).
18. OTA-TCT-606, supra note 6, at 116.
19. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, REPORT ON
APPLICATIONS FOR ORDERS AUTHORIZING OR APPROVING THE INTERCEPTION OF WIRE,
ORAL, OR ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS, 1985-92 (1992).
INTERCEPTION APPLICATIONS AUTHORIZED:
STATE FEDERAL TOTAL
1984 512 289 801
1985 541 243 784
1986 504 250 754
1987 437 236 673
1988 445 293 738
1989 453 310 763
1990 548 324 872
1991 500 356 856
TOTAL: 3940 2301 6241
Id.
20. Communications and Computer Surveillance, Privacy and Security, Hearing before
the Subcommittee on Technology, Environment and Aviation, of the House Committee on
Science, Space, and Technology, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) [hereinafter Communications]
(statement of Representative Dan Glickman).
21. The total number of criminal wiretap orders obtained in 1992 was 919. Id. at 10
(statement of James Kallstrom, Special Agent in Charge, FBI).
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2. Current Difficulties That New Technologies Pose. -Wire-
tapping is a very important investigatory tool for law enforcement.
Ever since the portentous dissent of Justice Brandeis in Olmstead
v. United States,22 the traditional thematic concern has been with
controlling possible abuses by the increased ability of government
agencies and private individuals to access more and more private
information. In the past few years, the problem set has dramatical-
ly changed course. There are still incredible personal privacy
interests at stake with the emerging technologies, but at the same
time some of these very technologies may make it prohibitively
expensive, if not impossible, for the effective use of wiretaps by law
enforcement.
In the execution of legally authorized electronic surveillance
today, law enforcement agents are confronting very real problems.
In April 1994, the FBI released a survey of federal, state and local
law enforcement agencies that identified 183 instances where the
agencies had been precluded from fully implementing authorized
electronic surveillance (e.g., wiretaps, pen registers and trap and
traces) due to technological impediments.23 Anecdotal evidence
tends to put instances of such difficulties at even higher numbers.
Undoubtedly, law enforcement agents are going to continue to
face increasing difficulty in isolating target calls, and one would
expect a whole new flood of problems will be associated with the
advent of cheap digital telephony utilizing encryption software.
Furthermore, law enforcement agencies have faced technical
difficulties in eavesdropping on information transfers which were
utilizing telecommunications carriers' services such as call forward-
ing and cellular technology.
22. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
23. See COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 17, at 15. Technology-based
problems encountered by federal, state, and local law enforcers:
Cellular port capacity 54
Inability to capture dialed digits timely 33
Speed dialing/voice dialing/call waiting 20
Voice mail forwarding and retrieving 12
Call forwarding 10
Cellular provider could not intercept long-distance calls 4
Direct inward dial trunk group (isolation troubles) 4
Digital Centrex (isolation troubles) 4
Other (call back, trap & trace difficulties, isolations) 42
TOTAL PROBLEMS 183
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C. The Study of Policy Tensions Over Electronic Surveillance is
Fruitful
The study of the federal government's attempts to respond to
the telecommunications changes, which potentially impose
enormous impediments to legally authorized electronic surveillance
by the law enforcement and intelligence communities, is bound to
yield useful insights into an important social debate. This debate
pits two incredibly important interests against one another. On the
one hand lies perhaps the most powerful investigatory technique
available to the government, and on the other hand is the incred-
ible importance of secure data. This is a classic example where
lawmakers are faced with the policy tensions that emerging
technologies pose.
Broadly speaking, there are three sets of interests at stake in
the debate over the wiretapping capabilities of the FBI and other
government agencies. The most obvious concern comes from the
nation's law enforcement and intelligence operatives. The
government has legitimate and compelling interests in apprehend-
ing and deterring criminals and terrorists. A different set of
arguments is heard from civil libertarians who are concerned with
general infringements into personal privacy, as well as government
monitoring of political dissent. Finally, the interests of American
industry are considerable. All businesses which use computers
extensively are interested in the privacy and security of information
that is transmitted and stored. Encryption technology can protect
sensitive information against the vulnerability of electronic
transmission. Furthermore, the American software industry is
particularly interested in the fate of government regulations
concerning encryption technology software. Hence, businesses are
deeply concerned with protecting their trade secrets, protecting the
integrity of the credit markets and retaining a competitive market
share in the software industry. Thus, the debate implicates a
governance viewpoint, a rights-based viewpoint and an economic
viewpoint.
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III. Setting the Stage: A Primer on Wiretaps and Recent
Changes in the Nature of Telecommunications
A. Legal Background of Wiretaps
1. Fourth Amendment Development in Electronic
Surveillance. -The Constitutional framers wanted to prevent
arbitrary use of government power to maintain surveillance over
the citizenry. The framers, therefore, limited the government
through the Fourth Amendment to keep individuals "secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures."'24 In the 1967 case of Katz v. United
States,' the Supreme Court accepted Justice Brandeis' view that
the Fourth Amendment protects persons not places.26 In deciding
Katz, the Court articulated the fundamental test of Fourth
Amendment personal privacy protection: whether the individual
has a reasonable or justifiable expectation of privacy in a given
situation.27 Therefore, electronic communications are protected
by the Fourth Amendment to the degree that individuals have
legally justified expectations of privacy in these communications.
Also in 1967, the Supreme Court in Berger v. New York28
struck down a state wiretap statute that did not conform to a
particularity requirement.29 The Court asserted that without a
particularity requirement, wiretaps could become impermissibly
wide nets capturing "any and all conversations."3  In order to
avoid the electronic functional-equivalent of the traditionally
despised general search, the Berger Court required that before a
judge authorizes an electronic search or seizure, that judge must
find that the wiretapping situation meets certain requirements.3'
24. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
25. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
26. Id. at 351. In Katz, the Supreme Court held that electronic surveillance of a
telephone call by the police constituted a warrantless search and seizure. Id.
27. Id. at 351.
28. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 59.
31. The four requirements are as follows: first, the law enforcement agents must provide
a description of the relevant crime, the information sought, the place where the interception
will occur and the persons whose communications are to be seized; second, the search must
be designed to minimize any interception of parties not named in the investigation; third, the
wiretap must be of limited duration; and fourth, there must be subsequent notice to the
parties surveilled unless there are exigent circumstances. Id. at 58-60; see also COMMrr'EE
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Many investigatory technologies have been held by the courts not
to implicate the kind of search addressed by the Fourth Amend-
ment. For example, the use of trained dogs32 for scent and
flashlights33 and binoculars34 for sight have been found not to
trigger constitutional concerns.
2. Title III and Other Statutory Regulations on Electronic
Surveillance.-The right to privacy in electronic communications
was first codified in Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Title 111),36 the federal wiretap statute.
Title III codified the Fourth Amendment search and seizure
protections as applied against electronic surveillance. The statute
simultaneously outlawed the use of electronic surveillance by
private individuals while authorizing its use, pursuant to a court
order, by law enforcement officials engaged in the investigation of
specific types of major crimes. 37  Thus, Title III's general prohibi-
tion against interception of wire and oral communications extends
to private as well as government surveillance.38  This legislation
was a needed Congressional response to protect individual privacy
ON THE JUDICIARY, OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL AND SAFE STREETS ACT OF 1968, S. REP.
No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 74-75 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2161-62.
If any of these four requirements are not met, a violation of the fourth amendment will
occur.
32. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696,707 (1983); United States v. Viera, 644
F.2d 509, 510-11 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 867 (1981).
33. See United States v. Less, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927). But see State v. Schmidt, 359
So. 2d 133, 135-36 (La. 1978) (finding that in certain circumstances, police use of flashlights
is not covered by the plain view exception).
34. See United States v. Rucinski, 658 F.2d 741, 746 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 939 (1982).
35. Where, however, technological advancements enhance human perception by so great
a degree as to implicate justifiable expectations of privacy, the government's use of such
instruments may necessarily invoke constitutional safeguards. See United States v. Taborda,
635 F.2d 131, 139 (2d Cir. 1980). But see Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227,
234-39 (1986); Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1, 3 (9th Cir. 1966) (finding that the use
of a scintillation detector to sense radiation of a wristwatch in hallway outside defendant's
apartment was not unreasonable).
36. Pub. L. No. 90-351, §§ 801-804, 82 Stat. 197, 211-25 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (West 1970 & Supp. 1996)) [hereinafter Title III].
37. COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 31, at 66.
38. Fred Jay Meyer, Don't Touch That Dial: Radio Listening Under the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 416, 429-30 (1988). The Fourth
Amendment protections are limits only upon searches and seizures conducted by government
officials. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921); Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 206 (1960).
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rights from the ever increasing ability of private and government
actors to access personal information of others.
The case of United States v. Seidlitz39 is representative of a
trend in the courts that now has become familiar. Congressional
action in the area of technology is very quickly made obsolete by
the advancement of science that was not contemplated by the
original legislation. Seidlitz established that the interception of a
computer transmission was not contemplated by the original
statute's concern with "wire communication" of an "aural acquisi-
tion."'  Hence, Congress responded by passing the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA) t which amended
Title III. This Act specifically protected the interception of
electronic communications.42 After telecommunications techno-
logy had changed, Congress responded legislatively to preserve the
balance between privacy interests and law enforcement needs. The
ECPA addresses the interception of wire, oral and electronic
communications, as well as access to stored wire and electronic
communications and the use of pen registers and trap and trace
devices.43 Specifically, the ECPA extended privacy protections to
a new range of technologies such as electronic mail, cellular
telephones and paging devices.' Thus, the ECPA clarified, in the
milieu of new computer and telecommunications technologies, what
federal privacy protections and securities existed. The ECPA
brought consonance between the changes in telecommunications
and the spirit of Title III protections, which continue to be the
primary law safeguarding the security and privacy of communica-
tions today.
39. 589 F.2d 152 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 922 (1979).
40. Id. at 156-57.
41. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1848 (100 Stat.) (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-2521, 2701-2710, 3117, 3121-3126).
42. Id.
43. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1988).
44. COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT
OF 1986, H.R. REP. 647, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-19 (1986).
45. Leahy, supra note 2. Of course, the ECPA did not, as no legislation can, anticipate
and address all issues related to emerging technologies. See, e.g., Shubert v. Metrphone, Inc.,
898 F.2d 401 (3d Cir. 1990) (finding that the ECPA does not impose a general duty upon
cellular phone service provider to encrypt or otherwise render transmissions incapable of
interception under 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2511(3), 2520).
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B. Cryptography and New Telecommunications Services
1. The Mechanics of Encryption.-Electronic information can
be protected by encryption. Encryption is the scrambling of
information using sophisticated mathematical algorithms, and its
use can make it practically impossible for anyone to randomly
decipher the protected information.46 Only those authorized to
read or use the information are able to do so.
Using a mathematical algorithm, data encryption software
allows a user to translate digital data into a coded form which is
very difficult for any user without the software's key to interpret.47
Hence, the protection the software affords a message is not from
interception, but from meaningful utilization of the message.
Currently, there are two primary encryption systems in wide
use.4" The Data Encryption Standard (DES) is the most common
single-key system utilized in the United States. Its fifty-six bit key
length gives seventy quadrillion possible key combinations.4 9
DES, which scrambles every eight characters of a message with the
designated key, has been the government standard since 1977.50
The other primary system uses a pair of keys to encrypt and
decrypt data. The "Rivest-Shamir-Aldeman" (RSA) algorithm is
such a two-key system that utilizes keys approximately two hundred
digits long.
The two communicating parties using a tow-key encryption
method must share at least one key before transactions can
proceed; a means to transmit keys for this purpose is called a
public-key infrastructure.5 Rather than using the same encryption
formula to both encrypt and decrypt the data, a matched pair of
keys can be used. Each encryption key performs a one-way
transformation upon the data. Each key is, therefore, the inverse
function of the other. The public key is made available by its
46. OTA-TCT-606, supra note 6, at 112, n.3. A software key contains a preset number
of bits; generally speaking the more bits the algorithm utilizes the more secure the
encryption. Id.
47. Id. at 112.
48. There are several other powerful encryption programs in use. One new program,
PGP ("Pretty Good Privacy") is gaining in popularity.
49. TiME-LtFE BOOKS, UNDERSTANDING COMPUTERS: COMPUTER SECURITY 93 (1986).
50. OTA-TCT-606, supra note 6, at 121.
51. Id. at 53.
19961
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52owner, while the private key is kept secret. To send a private
message, an author scrambles a document using the intended
recipient's public encryption formula. As a result, secure communi-
cations are possible between parties with no previous relation-
ships.5 3
A third important form of cryptography is a signature
verification algorithm, commonly called a digital signature. A
digital signature is an essential tool for securing information
systems by authenticating message contents and sender identifica-
tion.54
Under the Computer Security Act of 1987,"5 the Department
of Commerce's National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) has primary responsibility for establishing computer security
standards. 6  However, it is thought that the super-secretive
National Security Agency (created in 1947 to respond to the Cold
War threat) continues to control the Commerce Department's
efforts in this area.57
2. The Troubles Associated with Widespread Encryption
Use.-The basic concern that the government has expressed is that
sophisticated, user-friendly and inexpensive encryption software will
seriously impair the ability of law enforcement and intelligence
agencies to carry out meaningful electronic surveillance.5 8  Real
time decryption is critical for rapid response to very serious and
life-threatening criminal activity. Likewise, the expense associated
with decryption is obviously a public policy concern. Moreover, in
an age of the World Trade Center and the Oklahoma City
bombings, the growing apprehension of widespread terrorism is,
unfortunately, justified.
A confluence of recent factors has lead to encryption use in
the commercial environment. Over the last ten years, rapid and
52. Id. at 113.
53. The Threat of Foreign Economic Espionage, supra note 1, at 256-57 (statement of
Dr. Nathan P. Myhrvold, Vice President, Advanced Technology and Business Development,
Microsoft Corp.).
54. OTA-TCT-606, supra note 6, at 124.
55. Computer Security Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-235, 101 Stat. 235 (1987) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 15 to 40 U.S.C.).
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., OTA-TCT-606, supra note 6, at 160 (statement of Representative Jack
Brooks).
58. Id. at 119.
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widespread growth in the commercial sector's dependence on
computers and data networks to accomplish business objectives has
been essential to economic competitiveness. Therefore, electronic
networks utilize encryption in order to protect the business data
contained therein.
The technological breakthrough of cheap, powerful encryption
has generated problems as well as benefits. There is a fear on the
part of our nation's intelligence and law enforcement agencies that
readily available encryption programs will be utilized by terrorists,
drug dealers and others to shield their activities from government
action. 9 Computer security encryption thwarts not only criminals
and hackers but also law enforcement agencies and intelligence
organizations in their surveillance capabilities. Encryption devices
make it more difficult and expensive for law enforcement agencies
to obtain court-authorized information that they had previously
obtained with little difficulty. Consequently, some law enforcement
agencies are working for legislation that requires encryption
software developers to provide a backdoor for these agencies to
cipher the information.' This tension between the policy objec-
tives of encouraging the development and widespread use of
cost-effective information safeguards and controlling the proli-
feration of safeguard technologies which impair U.S. intelligence
and law-enforcement capabilities has resulted in a monumental
struggle to control cryptography via federal standards and export
controls.61
3. Some Other "Digital Telephony" Problems.-As common
carriers switch to digital communications to transmit voice and
computer data more efficiently, the ability of law enforcement
agents pursuant to a valid wiretap authorization to capture and to
convert the digital signals into intelligible communications is
threatened.62 New services and advanced technologies employed
by telecommunications carriers are permitting simultaneous
communications of different users over fiber optics as well as wire.
Features and services such as cellular telephones and call forward-
ing afford users the ability to be highly mobile and to redirect their
59. Id. at 9.
60. Joshua Quittner, Computer Code Will 'Hide' Users: But the Feds Want Their Own
Key, NEWSDAY, June 3, 1991, at 4.
61, OTA-TCT-606, supra note 6, at 8-9.
62. S. REP. No. 4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 18-19 (1995).
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calls. Call forwarding and cellular transmissions can make targeting
the origin or destination of a particular communication difficult.
Many believe that the problems these technologies pose for law
enforcement can be ameliorated with the cooperation of service
providers.
IV. Current Government Initiatives to Respond to Wiretap
Difficulties
A. Export Controls on Powerful Encryption Products
1. Background: The Government's Position.-Under the
Arms Export Control Act,63 American software manufacturers
and retailers are currently restricted from exporting certain
powerful encryption products, ones using greater than a 40-bit key,
without a license granted by the State Department.' The restrict-
ed products are designated as dangerous to national security by the
National Security Agency because they are difficult to decrypt.
The most effective encryption standards, DES and RSA, cannot be
used in software exported to other countries, but they may be used
within the United States.65 The selling abroad of U.S. versions of
popular programs with an encryption function like Microsoft Excel,
a spreadsheet application, or Norton Utilities, a trouble-shooting
aid, is "somewhat more [restricted] than surface-to-air missiles but
less than nuclear weapons," according to experts.6
The basic policy goal of this long-standing government position
is to reduce the likelihood that enemy governments and interna-
tional terrorists will gain possession of powerful encryption
technologies that the American government would have difficulty
deciphering.67 Hence, the government's view is that effective
electronic surveillance of hostile foreign powers which may commit
crimes or acts of terror within the United States is a national
security concern which trumps a business's right to sell its encryp-
63. 22 U.S.C. § 2751 (1990).
64. OTA-TCT-606, supra note 6, at 45.
65. Mitch Ratcliffe and Mitzi Waltz, Encryption Raises Special Hurdles, MACWEEK,
Nov. 2, 1992, at 20.
66. John Schwartz, The Software Security 'Threat'-U.S. Fears Foreign Use of Encryption
Features, WASH. POST, June 18, 1994, at Al (quoting Steven B. Lipner of Trusted
Information Systems).
67. Id. at Al, A10 (Vice-President Gore defending the Clinton administration's strict
export controls).
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tion products abroad.' The entire policy is premised on the
contention that these export controls make it much more difficult
for foreign criminals and governments to possess strong encryption
capabilities.
2. Export Controls are Antiquated, Ineffective and Causing
Economic Harm to American Computer Companies.-The
continued presence of powerful encryption products on the
munitions list of the Commerce Department has come under
considerable scrutiny and attack by industry leaders, academics and
politicians alike.6 9 The most common objection voiced points out
that the expense of encryption made sense during the Cold War,
but now such controls are counterproductive for two main reasons.
First, they are ineffective because foreign entities are able to obtain
powerful encryption programs anyway.70 Second, even if there are
some marginal benefits gained by reducing the availability of
encryption to foreign criminal elements, the costs which these
controls are imposing on the U.S. software industry are crushing.71
Most nations do not regulate encryption software.72  While
American firms cannot export current encryption standards, foreign
companies certainly can produce and export many such products.73
This advantage means that foreign companies can capture more of
the market for electronic safeguards. This is particularly troubling
considering that security features are usually embedded inside
hardware and software products. Hence, foreign companies, as a
spillover effect, may capture more of the overall information
technology market worldwide as American hardware and software
with incidental encryption capabilities are barred from sale in
foreign markets. It is not difficult to understand, therefore, why
U.S. software developers are fearful about losing their share of
foreign markets to overseas competitors.
68. Id.
69. For a discussion of how antiquated export controls are hurting the United States in
critical technology areas and industry, see generally Robert Kuttner, How 'National Security'
Hurts National Competitiveness, HARV. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1991, at 140.
70. Charles L. Evans, Comment, U.S. Export Control of Encryption Software: Efforts
to Protect National Security Threaten the U.S. Software Industry's Ability to Compete in
Foreign Markets, 19 N.C. J. INT'L & COM. REG. 469, 489 (1994).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 481.
73. Id. at 482. For example, England freely allows the export of mass-market encryption
software.
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The United States software industry is one of the fastest
growing industries in the country. Moreover, it is one area where
the United States has become a clear leader in the international
markets-U.S. software accounts for some seventy to seventy-five
percent of all programs worldwide.74 In fact, the U.S. holds a
clear majority of a world market which is projected to reach $250
billion by the end of the decade. The fact that the U.S. computer
software and services sector is the world leader in skill, investment
and market share is not something to be taken lightly. The
effective competitiveness of the U.S. companies depends on
exportation of their products. Thus, any export controls imposed
on computer software are troubling.
Moreover, most U.S. export controls on encryption software
are ineffective and no longer meet any national security objec-
tives.7 5  They do, however, encourage the export of jobs and
revenue. Software in 1992 was a fifty-billion dollar industry in
America,76 but between six and nine billion dollars of the overall
mass market software industry is at risk due to encryption export
controls.77 Currently, the NSA only allows export of software
with an encryption key size of 40 bits or less, a standard which can
be cracked 65,000 times faster than one that utilizes 56 bits (e.g.
DES).78 In fact, a forty-bit key can be easily hacked on an
ordinary personal computer. It is not difficult, then, to see why
foreign consumers are not interested in buying encryption products
from the United States.
In spite of the export controls, both RSA and DES, as well as
even more powerful programs, are widely available in the United
States and elsewhere. PGP, a very powerful encryption program,
is currently available in shareware form on the Internet. Hence,
74. Id. at 480; Leahy, supra note 2, at 5 ("Right now, the United States is the undisputed
world leader, controlling some seventy percent of the market"); Steve Higgins, Breaking U.S.
Encryption Statute Could Be Costly, PC WEEK, Feb. 8, 1993, at 1, 16.
75. Export Controls on Mass Market Software: Hearing before the Subcomm. on
Economic Policy, Trade and Environment, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1993) [hereinafter Export
Controls] (testimony of Don Harbert, Vice President, Software Engineering Development
Corporation).
76. Leahy, supra note 2, at 5.
77. Export Controls, supra note 75, at 27 (testimony of Ray Ozzie, President, Iris
Associates, representing the Business Software Association.
78. Id. at 132 (statement of Martin E. Heilman, Professor of Electrical Engineering at
Stanford University, Implications of Encryption Policy on the National Information
Infrastructure).
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these controls are not keeping encryption out of the hands of
sophisticated criminals or foreign governments. Instead, the
technologies are simply not found in commercial packages
produced in the United States because companies cannot export
such programs.
79
3. Summary Remarks on Current Export Controls on
Encryption.-As the market for software increases, there is a
greater need for computer security, which is why most parties
involved in the U.S. software industry oppose restrictions on the
export of encryption software."0 Much of the restricted encryption
targeted by the NSA is already available outside the United States
by overseas manufacturers.81  Given the ubiquity of strong
encryption programs on the Internet as well as in thousands of
retail stores worldwide,82 the rationale behind export controls, at
least at the current 40-bit level, rings hollow. In the final analysis,
the present export control policy does not stifle the use of encryp-
tion abroad, rather, it only guarantees that such technology will be
supplied by foreign software vendors.
B. The Clipper Chip Initiative
1. Background: The Government's Position. -Concern over
the security of everyday electronic communications has been
reflected in the ongoing debates over key-escrow encryption and
the government's Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES). In
response to the increasing use of powerful encryption, on April 16,
1993 the Clinton Administration promulgated the Escrowed
Encryption Standard as a voluntary alternative to previous
encryption standards, including the original federal Data Encryp-
tion Standard. 3  The Clipper chip, a semiconductor device
designed for use in telephone systems, contains the EES encryp-
tion algorithm, called SKIPJACK.84 Products installed with the
79. The Threat of Foreign Economic Espionage, supra note 1, at 220 (statement of
Stephen T. Walker, President, Trusted Information Systems, Inc.).
80. Graeme Browning, Software Hardball, 24 NAT'L L.J. 2062, 2062-63 (1992). That
opposition has resulted in software lobbying in Washington, D.C. becoming more prominent
in the 1990s.
81. OTA-TCT-606, supra note 6, at 45. Sometimes such information is based on reviews
and descriptions available in articles or books. Id.
82. Popular programs like WordPerfect 6.0 now include encryption techniques.
83. OTA-TCT-606, supra note 6, at 10.
84. Id. at 9, n.14.
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Clipper chip use EES to safeguard voice, fax or computer data
transmitted through a telephone system.85
The real kicker to the Clipper chip initiative is its key-escrow
component. The government has built a functional trap door in the
Clipper chip so that law enforcement is able to continue to conduct
authorized electronic surveillance over messages created by Clipper
chip products. Specifically, the government will retain the
mathematical key which can decrypt any message sent with
products embedded with the Clipper chip.86 The key-escrowed
encryption initiative applies a separation of duties principle in its
utilization of two escrow agents. 87 The idea is to break the
mathematical key in half and put each half in the hands of a
different federal agency which would only release its half under
proper court order.88 Hence, the Clipper policy was meant to
satisfy the needs of the public by making available a powerful
encryption algorithm, while at the same time allowing the govern-
ment to use a predesigned access method to conduct proper
court-ordered surveillance.
The Clinton administration promoted this new "voluntary"
standard by using its market muscle in an attempt to make it an
industry standard. The idea was to implement EES by encouraging
all government agencies to use the Clipper chip for unclassified
transmissions. As a result, those companies and state governments
which did any business with the federal government would have to
buy Clipper chip hardware in order to communicate.
The Clipper chip initiative was solely an executive branch
undertaking urged by the NSA (which developed SKIPJACK).
EES was approved by the Department of Commerce as a Federal
Information Processing Standard (FIPS) in February 1994.89
According to Assistant Attorney General Jo Ann Harris, the
Department of Justice did not believe it needed Congressional
approval to implement this program which encouraged telecom-
munications and computer manufacturers to include the encryption
85. Id. at 117.
86. See, e.g., Evans, supra note 70, at 483.
87. OTA-TCT-606, supra note 6, at 117-18.
88. Attorney General Janet Reno has designated the National Institute of Standards and
Technology and the Treasury Department's Automated Systems Division as the original
escrow agents.
89. See 59 Fed. Reg. 5997-6005 (1994). This regulation describes the applicability,
implementation, and maintenance of the standard, as well as specifications for its use.
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chip in their products-an encryption chip which, of course, the
government could then decode with special keys.' Yet the
program would cost millions of dollars to establish and millions
more annually to maintain.91
2. The Clipper Chip Initiative is Rightfully Attacked as an
Ineffective Policy Which Creates Enormous Dangers and Imposes
Undue Costs.-The common response to the Clipper initiative is
that the basic underlying position, that no cryptographic standard
shall be stronger than what NSA can comfortably break, is
outdated and unrealistic in today's climate. Such a policy does not
work because any fixed level of security rapidly erodes under the
predictably rapid advances in computer technology, and any
standard trap door risks discovery, with catastrophic results. In
other words, what is breakable today by a friendly, well-funded
agency is soon broken by unfriendly, economic adversaries.92
a. Clipper's attempt to become an industry
standard. -Although putatively voluntary, the entire strategy
behind the Clipper chip initiative was to encourage wide use of
EES in order to ultimately reduce the variety of other encryption
products. This is accomplished by creating market dominance for
the EES which has the economic consequence of causing other
products to be scarcer and more costly.93 Furthermore, although
the Clinton administration stated that it had no plans of banning
any other encryption, this commitment was not binding upon future
administrations.94 There is a great fear, therefore, that once the
technology has taken hold, it will be very tempting for a future
administration to make it mandatory.
b. Government can and does abuse concentrated
power--Objections to the Clipper policy have come from civil
libertarians and industry leaders alike. In light of past experiences,
90. Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Technology and the Law of the Committee on
the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 131 (1994) (testimony of Jo Ann Harris, Assistant
Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice).
91. Hill Gets Earful on Clipper Chip Issue; Legislative Curb Possible, COMMON
CARRIER WEEK, May 9, 1994, available in 1994 WL 2312330.
92. The Threat of Foreign Economic Espionage, supra note 1, at 205 (statement of Dr.
Ronald L. Rivest, Professor of Computer Science, MIT).
93. OTA-TCT-606, supra note 6, at 10. As a result, only sophisticated crooks and
terrorists will have the more expensive, sophisticated encryption capabilities.
94. See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
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Americans have learned that government security is not fail-safe.
Computer hackers between April 1990 and May 1991 penetrated
computer systems at 34 Department of Defense sites by means of
Internet access. 95 In 1992, the Internal Revenue Service's internal
auditors named 368 employees who had used the Service's
Integrated Data Retrieval System without authority, for non-busi-
ness purposes.96  Examples of malfeasance included issuing of
fraudulent refunds, browsing through taxpayer accounts and
checking the personal accounts of neighbors, friends, relatives and
celebrities.97 Indeed even within the FBI, authorized users of the
National Crime Information Center misuse the network's informa-
tion with regularity. Examples include the use of information to
determine whether friends, neighbors or relatives have criminal
records, and background inquiries prompted by political purpos-
es.98 Examples of egregious governmental abuses go on and on.
Clearly, citizens and businesses have substantial trepidation and
anxiety associated with handing the keys to the dominant form of
encryption over to the government.
c. Trap doors can be Achilles heels.-Another consideration
is that a trap door is like a built-in Achilles heel; undoubtedly
thousands of rebellious or profit-seeking hackers will stage an
onslaught against EES when it becomes widely available. Also,
sophisticated foreign governments and international crime syndi-
cates may find it rational to mount an attack on the Clipper chip.
One successful attacker can destroy the secrecy of an enormous
amount of data. As an example of how relatively inexpensive it
would be to break the 512-bit Digital Signature Standard (which
the government announced in 1991), one scholar has estimated that
the government has come out with a standard which was at least
14,000 times weaker than that necessary to withstand a less than
95. OTA-TCT-606, supra note 6, at 2.
96. Id. at 3.
97. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IRS INFORMATION SYSTEMS WEAKNESSES
INCREASE RISK OF FRAUD AND IMPAIR RELIABILITY OF MANAGEMENT INFORMATION,
GAO/AIMD-93 34 (1993).
98. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NATIONAL CRIME INFORMATION
CENTER: LEGISLATION NEEDED TO DETER MISUSE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION
1-2 (1993); OTA-TCT-606, supra note 6, at 2-3.
[Vol. 101:1
1996] EFFECTIVE WIRETAPS IN THE INFORMATION AGE 119
full-out attack.99 Any similar attack on EES could lead to a
catastrophic failure of the national computer security system.
It is essential to always keep in mind how vulnerable decrypted
information is in the electronic environment. When a spy has
intercepted an electronic communication, he or she can send an
exact replica of the communication to a predetermined place where
it can be stored rapidly and inexpensively. "Fast, inexpensive
access based on message content is indispensable to spies because
they must sort through millions of irrelevant messages to find one
of interest."' °  Hence, powerful encryption keeps disastrous
electronic crime at bay. Without encryption, ten billion words of
electronic information can be scanned for a dollar, so even if only
one message in a million is of interest, $1 worth of scanning
produces 10,000 messages of interest.101 This can be accom-
plished on a $3000 personal computer. 2
d. Parties will simply add another layer of
encryption.-Beyond the dangers of abuse, the fundamental
problem with the Clipper chip idea is that no matter what regula-
tions, whether legally de jure or commercially de facto, are
imposed, individuals can always add their own encryption on top
of such a system. Any competent programmer, including thousands
of young "hackers," could easily write software to impose encryp-
tion on digital data, including digital voice transmission. In fact,
writing an encryption program is a basic first year exercise for
many computer science majors.
Since it is so easy to defeat any Clipper-like marketing scheme,
organized crime and others seriously intent on escaping the
government's scrutiny would be able to do so. In the worst
scenario, all the Clipper chip initiative would accomplish is to keep
low-cost encryption out of the hands of unwitting citizens and U.S.
99. A $25 million investment can buy 6,250,000 MIPS-years of computation and 5000
times that in 2017. Hence, $8.2 million dollars would be needed the break the proposed
DSS. The Threat of Foreign Economic Espionage, supra note 1, at 215-16 (statement of Dr.
Ronald L. Rivest, Professor of Computer Science, MIT).
100. Export Controls, supra note 75, at 127 (statement of Martin E. Heilman, Implications
of Encryption Policy on the National Information Infrastructure).
101. Id. at 127-28.
102. Id.
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companies, making them vulnerable to foreign espionage and
criminal tampering. 3
In light of these concerns, business leaders contend that the
Clipper chip initiative did not take commercial reality into account.
In the simplest terms, if the government has access to "secure"
data, then no one else is likely to trust the program. While
encryption has become a "routine business precaution ' 4 given
the ominous problems of computerized theft, industrial espionage,
forgery and electronic vandalism, a government controlled
encryption process would be unlikely to gain substantial commer-
cial support.
e. There is distrust over SKIPJACK's secretive develop-
ment.--Furthermore, beyond the belief that a backdoor leaves
protections weakened or vulnerable, there is incredible distrust
about the good faith of the government in the development of the
EES. Unlike the DES algorithm, EES is classified and not publicly
available for inspection.0 5 Indeed, the only time when the EES
algorithm has been made "available" was when the NSA allowed
five expert cryptographers to participate in a classified review of
SKIPJACK and publicly report their findings."° There is incredi-
ble anxiety and suspicion that NSA might have built a trap door in
EES or at least kept a key for itself.
3. Summary Remarks on the Clipper Chip Initiative. -Vice
President Gore announced on July 20, 1994 what many have
thought to be a change in the administration's Clipper chip
approach. In a letter addressed to Representative Maria Cantwell,
who had spearheaded the attack against the initiative, the Vice
President guaranteed that Clipper would remain voluntary and only
would be used for telephone equipment. 7 The letter also stated
that in the future the administration would work closely with
103. The Threat of Foreign Economic Espionage, supra note 1, at 264 (statement of Dr.
Nathan P. Myhrvold, Microsoft Corp.).
104. Eric Hirschhorn and David Peyton, Uncle Sam's Secret Decoder Ring, WASH. POST,
June 25, 1992, at A23.
105. See Evans, supra note 70, at 483.
106. OTA-TCT-606, supra note 6, at 118. For a more detailed discussion regarding the
details of "EES", see id. at 117-19.
107. Letter from Vice President Al Gore, to Representative Maria Cantwell (July 20,
1994). One of Representative Cantwell's constituents in the state of Washington is the
Microsoft Corporation.
[Vol. 101:1
1996] EFFECTIVE WIRETAPS IN THE INFORMATION AGE 121
industry and academic experts in developing electronic safeguard
technologies."l8
The Clipper chip initiative exhibits fundamental public policy
defects from both a technical and procedural viewpoints. From a
technical perspective, any initiative to burden the availability of
powerful encryption is bound to fail. Encryption technology is too
advanced, too valuable and too available given the proliferation of
networking systems. Furthermore, it is unrealistic to attempt to
induce individuals to buy hardware embedded with an encryption
standard which will soon be out dated. A standard based on weak
cryptography is bound to require replacement or upgrading given
rapid technological changes. DES is arguably a weak encryption
standard and is reaching the end of its utility. The cost of replacing
DES and all its applications will be great and the costs of having to
do this again in a few years for a weak security system would be
enormous. 109
The idea that government would attempt to impose, even
indirectly through its role as market participant, a substandard
security system-i.e., dumb down technology-threatens both the
continued growth and development of computer technology and the
United States' economic competitiveness. More worrisome, given
the state of current technology, is that criminals would simply use
phones which are not manufactured with the Clipper chip.
Furthermore, foreign customers may refuse to buy devices with the
chip. Finally, any system giving enforcers a back-door master key
is open to abuse, and there is no guarantee that a hacker (through
cunning) nor a foreign government (through bribery) would not
gain access.
These technical deficiencies are interwoven with procedural
faults by the Clinton administration. The government is operating
with poor information and under misguided assumptions. This is
apparent in some government documents. For example, the Office
of Technology Assessment has stated that vendors and product
developers claim that buyers do not strongly demand safeguards
and, therefore, encryption will not be offered domestically.11
Another misconception is that the U.S. government has the most
108. Id.
109. See The Threat of Foreign Economic Espionage, supra note 1, at 214 (statement of
Dr. Ronald L. Rivest, Professor of Computer Science, MIT).
110. See OTA-TCT-606, supra note 6, at 45.
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expertise in electronic cryptography."' These claims are both
illogical and unrealistic.
Moreover, the entire process of deliberation surrounding
Clipper was secretive. This led to immense distrust. Given the
pioneer attitude of computer users, it is important to engender their
support. Some might say that the culture, if not purpose, of
technology is characterized by rebelliousness.
C. The Digital Telephony Bill
1. Background: The Government's Position.-On March 25,
1994, the Clinton administration forwarded the "Digital Telephony
and Communications Privacy Improvement Act of 1994" (The
Digital Telephony Bill) to Congress for consideration. Proponents
argued that the legislation did not alter or expand the government's
authority to conduct court-ordered electronic wiretaps.11 2 Rather,
the Digital Telephony Bill was meant to clarify, in more precise
terms, the nature and extent of the telecommunications service
providers' assistance requirement that was enacted by Congress in
1970.11' The bill went through a few significant changes and was
passed into law in November of 1994. The Act in its final form was
known as the "Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement
Act."
11 4
In its original 1968 form, Title III had contained no provision
addressing what obligations, if any, telecommunications carriers
owed law enforcement in assisting with authorized wiretaps. After
Application of the United States,"5 where the Ninth Circuit held
that, absent a specific statutory mandate, federal courts could not
require carriers to assist lawful wiretaps, Congress responded by
amending 18 U.S.C. Section 2518(4).116 The Supreme Court
111. See id. at 9.
112. See COMMIrrEE ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 17, at 18, 24.
113. Communications, supra note 20, at 11-13 (statement of James Kallstrom, Special
Agent in Charge, Special Operations Division, New York Field Division, FBI).
114. Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994).
115. 427 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1970).
116. The language added was:
An order authorizing the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication
under this chapter shall, upon request of the applicant, direct that a provider of
wire or electronic communication service, landlord, custodian or other person shall
furnish the applicant forthwith all information, facilities, and technical assistance
necessary to accomplish the interception unobtrusively and with a minimum of
interference with the services that such service provider, landlord, custodian, or
[Vol. 101:1
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interpreted this amending language in United States v. New York
Telephone"7 to allow federal courts to require, upon request of
the government, "any assistance necessary to accomplish an
electronic interception." ' Whether companies had any obliga-
tion to design their systems to avoid impeding authorized electronic
surveillance has never been litigated." 9 As the nature of the
services and the media of transmissions used by telecommunica-
tions have advanced, however, law enforcement agencies have had
increasing difficulty conducting lawful surveillance." After
considering evidence provided by the General Accounting Office,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the telecommunication
industry itself, the Senate Judiciary Committee determined that
legislative action was warranted.12'
The rubric of "digital telephony" is often used to include most
of the telecommunications changes that now implicate law
enforcement and privacy concerns. The distinction between analog
and digital telephony does not capture all such difficulties currently
existing. Some problems exist within both the digital and analog
environment, as, for example, problems with cellular and wireless
service as well as call forwarding. Other problems are linked to the
exponential increase in transactional data generated by the millions
of users of on-line services."~ Many of the digital telephony
problems bring to the fore privacy concerns."' Not only has
digital technology jeopardized traditional interception techniques,
it has at the same time made unauthorized manipulation of the
telecommunications switches and control systems a much larger
problem than in an analog network. 24
person is according the person whose communications are to be intercepted. Any
provider, of wire or electronic communication service, landlord, custodian or other
person furnishing such facilities or technical assistance shall be compensated
therefor by the applicant for reasonable expenses incurred in providing such
facilities or assistance.
18 U.S.C. § 2518(4) (1993) (as amended Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 654 (1970)).
117. 434 U.S. 159 (1977).
118. Id. at 177.
119. See COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 17, at 13.
120. See Supra Part II.B.2.
121. See COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 17, at 14-16.
122. The use of fiber optic cable has made the number of communications transmitted
through a single line increase enormously.
123. See COMMITrEE ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 17, at 12.
124. The Threat of Foreign Economic Espionage, supra note 1, at 236 (statement of
Geoffrey W. Turner, Senior Consultant, SRI).
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The Digital Telephony Bill was meant to preserve the
government's ability, pursuant to a court order or other lawful
authorization, to intercept communications involving advanced
technologies, such as digital or wireless transmissions, and features
and services, such as call forwarding, speed dialing and conference
calling, while both protecting the privacy of communications and
allowing the introduction of new technologies, features and
services.1" The Digital Telephony Bill sought to balance three
key policies: preserving the capability of law enforcement agencies
to carry out properly authorized intercepts; protecting privacy in
the face of increasingly powerful and ubiquitous technologies; and
avoiding any impediment to the development of new communi-
cation technologies. 26
Basically, the Digital Telephony Bill requires telecommunica-
tions carriers to ensure their systems have the capability to identify
quickly the content of targeted communications, isolate the origin
and destination of targeted communications and provide the
intercepted information to law enforcement in a way which allows
unobtrusive intercepts.27 The legislation provides for the federal
government to pay carriers for the just and reasonable compliance
costs incurred in modifying or retrofitting existing equipment,
services and other features. Also, the legislation provides that the
federal government will pay for expansions in capacity to accom-
modate law enforcement needs."2 To this end, a five hundred
million dollar budget has been appropriated for each of the next
four years.
In addition, and perhaps most importantly, the legislation
explicitly exempts a carrier from any responsibility to decrypt
encrypted communications unless the carrier has provided the
encryption method. 29 The legislation did not address either key
escrow encryption nor limiting the use of encryption within the
United States. Indeed, § 2602 protects the right to use encryption.
125. COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 17, at 9.
126. Id. at 13.
127. Id. at 9.
128. Id. at 10.
129. Id. at § 2602(b)(3).
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2. The Digital Telephony Act is Responsible, Privacy Enhanc-
ing Legislation with only a Limited Threat of Abuse and an
Incidental Effect on Technology.-The Digital Telephony Bill had
numerous procedural and substantive merits to recommend it as an
example of effective policy-making. Although the Act was opposed
by many civil libertarians and security experts, most of the Big
Brother fears did not resonate given the Act's approach to
technical challenges. There were, however, some objections.
a. Mandatory compliance is appropriate.-Some argued that
companies within the telecommunications industry as a whole have
had a long tradition of working with law enforcement under current
law. However, such a company-by-company approach is becoming
untenable with the proliferation of services and service provi-
ders.130 What was noticeably absent in the attack on the Digital
Telephony Bill was any powerful argument that the legislation was
ineffective or that it did not address important wiretapping needs.
b. Very limited privacy risks are implicated.-A weak,
attenuated argument was made by some who claimed that the
Digital Telephony Bill was analogous to designing trap doors that
can be used by law enforcement for court-ordered intercept of
communications. 13 However, a trap door analogy seems inappo-
site. Rather, the DTB simply requires the telecommunications
industry to do as much as it reasonably can to design its systems in
a manner that allows the carriers to isolate communications.
Perhaps the strongest objection raised rests upon the disingen-
uous assumption on the part of some Digital Telephony Bill
proponents that the interception capability will be exercised only
by law enforcement authorities and only under court order. The
idea was that the encouragement of these interception capabilities
introduces interception risks to all innocent users of this modified
telecommunications systems.132 Although it is certainly true that
the capabilities could be abused by government, the carriers
130. COMMrrTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 17, at 15.
131. See The Threat of Foreign Economic Espionage, supra note 1, at 190 (statement of
Geoffrey W. Turner, Senior Consultant, SRI).
132. Id. at 236.
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themselves and third parties, the potential for harm from any given
perpetrator is relatively diffuse.'33
Despite the concerns of some opponents, the Digital Telepho-
ny Bill was narrowly tailored. It made clear that telecommunica-
tions service providers that support the transport or switching of
communications for private networks or for the sole purpose of
interconnecting carriers need not meet any wiretap standards.'34
As a result, only those common carriers which have traditionally
been heavily regulated were asked to work with law enforcement
in service designs. The legislation also did not cover private branch
exchanges (PBXs). Thus, there will be times when the common
carrier will be unable to isolate the communications of an indi-
vidual whose transmissions are coming through a PBX. The
legislation, however, did not expressly approve trunk line inter-
cepts. The minimization requirement under Title III means that
the courts must "scrutinize very carefully requests to intercept
trunk lines.'' 13 5
c. The legislation is privacy enhancing in a number of
respects.-Although the legislation did make telecommunications
transmissions marginally more vulnerable due to the ability to
isolate messages, the Digital Telephony Bill is, at the same time,
privacy enhancing. For example, it eliminates the use of subpoenas
to obtain E-mail addresses and similar transactional data from
electronic communications service providers. Previous law allowed
the government to obtain transactional logs containing various facts
about an on-line user merely upon presentation of an administra-
tive subpoena without any judicial intervention.136 The legislation
also extends privacy protections of the ECPA to cordless phones
and certain radio communications.
137
Significantly, the law requires affirmative intervention of the
common carriers' personnel for switch-based interceptions,138 and,
133. A question left somewhat unanswered is who will bear the cost of ensuring that
these intercept capabilities are not accessed by anyone other than law enforcement agencies
acting under court orders.
134. See COMMITrEE ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 17, at 18-19. Also, PBXs are
excluded as well at ATM networks and all information services such as Internet providers,
Prodigy and America-On-Line. Id. at § 2602(b)(2).
135. COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 17, at 24.
136. Id. at 18.
137. Id.
138. Id. at § 2604.
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thus, law enforcement cannot remotely or independently activate
interceptions within the switching premises of the carrier.139 This
last legislative mandate essentially placates some fear about the
specter of government abuse. Finally the legislation exempted
common carriers from' designing systems which thwart encryption.
d. Industry was free to choose the means of
compliance.--Beyond the narrow scope and privacy--enhancing
qualities of the Act, the Digital Telephony Bill set out industry
compliance standards which were obtainable and flexible. The law
establishes a "reasonableness" standard for compliance of carriers
and manufacturers." ° From a practical perspective, if it is unrea-
sonable for a service or technology to be brought into compliance
with the interception requirements, then the service or technology
can still be deployed.141 Thus, the legislation addressed the
common fear that such legislation would impede the development
of new technologies. Another example of public policy genius is
the express prohibition upon law enforcement to dictate specific
system design features; therefore, law enforcement cannot bar
introduction of new features and technologies."
3. Summary Remarks on the Digital Telephony Bill.-The
Digital Telephony Bill was an extraordinary example of how the
legislative process can work. Because Congress had the ability and
the political obligation to conduct extensive hearings on the matter,
many different perspectives were considered. As with a lot of
highly visible legislation, which dictates political accountability,
different interests were carefully addressed. Many of the difficul-
ties that law enforcement agencies had encountered were signifi-
cant. At the same time, new technologies had left telecommunica-
tions subscribers vulnerable to new privacy threats. The Digital
Telephony Bill arranged to finance the technical cooperation of
carriers to help develop systems amenable to wiretaps, while at the
139. Other privacy enhancing capabilities include allowing any person to petition the FCC
for review of standards of wiretap capability implementation with an enumerated factor to
be considered (that of privacy of communications not targeted) and expressly providing that
the authority under pen register and trap and trace orders cannot be used to obtain tracking
or location information.
140. COMMITrEE ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 17, at 19.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 19.
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same time guaranteeing further protections for the privacy rights of
users.
V. Comparing Success with Failure: Dumbing Down Techno-
logy Creates Unacceptable Dangers
"All we are asking is what the Congress has already given; that
is, the continued lawful access."' 43
Undoubtedly, there are many lessons gained by an examina-
tion of the government's initiatives in the area of emerging
telecommunications. The reality with a lot of technology is that the
genie is out of the bottle. Legal responses must be fashioned in a
way that recognizes this fundamental characteristic. It is not
rational to simply prohibit the use of any technology which impedes
law enforcement's ability to capture even the most heinous of
villains. It is not responsive to simply ask, as Director Sessions has,
for what once was. The common plea by law enforcement agents
that they do not want anything more than what they previously had
does not address the changes in society. The most effective
protection for sensitive information in a highly distributed environ-
ment is not traditional access control technologies for stationary
systems, but information-based security-for example, encryption
which travels with the information regardless of location.1" In a
dynamic society, we cannot rearrange technological orderings or
attempt to dumb down technology without causing some uninten-
ded consequences elsewhere. Therefore, it is of critical importance
that the government meaningfully examine the total mix of
consequences which regulating different forms of technology will
produce.
Some governments abroad view radio, television, direct
broadcast satellites, fax machines and other modern communica-
tions devices as threats. Undoubtedly, CBs, walkie-talkies and
computers have been used in crimes. In the United States,
however, law and order is but one of many important social values
to be balanced in the formulation of public policy. Security is a
very broad concept. National security should recognize the
importance of the economy. For example, runaway trade imbalan-
143. The Threat of Foreign Economic Espionage, supra note 1, at 114 (statement of
William S. Sessions, FBI Director).
144. See id. at 186 (statement of Geoffrey W. Turner, Senior Consultant, SRI).
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ces can be devastating. Also, as more electronic communication is
transmitted over public lines, the growing threats to unencrypted
data may trump law enforcement's needs to decrypt. It would be
foolish to weaken cryptography for government needs at the
expense of ignoring society's needs.
The following sections discuss how the technology, the
fundamental values, the regulated players and the political history
of the three initiatives described above inform our judgment about
whether these have been desirable legal responses to the challenges
which law enforcement and society, as a whole, are facing.
A. Issues in Democratic Decision-Making: Open Government
"Essentially, the public relations campaign for Clipper has
been about as intelligently handled as Whitewater."145  Not
surprisingly, when designing effective programs to regulate
technology in the future, public relations will be an important part
of the strategy. The selection of information security standards has,
in the past, been a closed process. The result has been a funda-
mentally flawed process which is more likely to elicit suspicion"
and confrontation from the regulated interests than to foster the
development of good policy. For example, the federal digital
signature standard, utilizing the DSS algorithm, was created by
NSA and adopted by NIST without any input from U.S. industry.
This closed-door approach in the development of DSS, along with
its patent problems, has created a confrontational, not cooperative,
environment with business.147
The Clipper chip initiative, which was similarly devised, has
met with similar difficulty. EES was selected and approved by a
process closed to those outside the executive branch. Indeed, the
procedural means by which the key-escrow encryption is to be
deployed continues to be developed in this "closed forum.
'' 4
NSA, which is not in the business of balancing competing interests,
rightly identified an intelligence problem. Its response in EES,
145. Michael Schrag, Code Blues: Why the Clipper Chip Plan Is Having Unintended
Effects, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 1994, at B3.
146. Not surprisingly, many believe that law enforcement and intelligence agencies will
not use the keys only for lawful purposes. See Philip Elmer-DeWitt, Who Should Keep the
Keys?, TIME, Mar. 14, 1994, at 90.
147. The Threat of Foreign Economic Espionage, supra note 1, at 213-14 (statement of
Dr. Ronald L. Rivest, Professor of Computer Science, MIT).
148. OTA-TCT-606, supra note 6, at 15.
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however, did not take into account the effectiveness, the economics
and the privacy interests sacrificed by such a scheme. One has to
believe that, in much the same way that the policy of controlling
exports on outdated encryption technology is rationalized, the
isolation of decision-making in an executive agency which has a
well-defined mission does not do service to the complex issues
implicated by any policies which restrict the free use of safeguard
technology.
In order to better address competing interests in the future,
Congress could support structural changes like making the
Commerce Department's NIST more independent from NSA. One
way to do this would be providing NIST with greater funding and
discontinuing NSA's formal advisory role for domestic crypto-
graphy issues.
149
While the Clipper chip initiative and the export control policies
have generally been unilateral pronouncements, the Digital
Telephony Bill was a legislative measure which went through the
rigors of open debate. The Act did as much as it could to ensure
law enforcement's continued success in wiretaps, while maintaining
the privacy interests of telecommunications users and minimizing
the burdens placed upon the technology makers.
It is also significant to note that the FBI did not spring the
proposal on the telecommunications carriers without notice. In
response to the problems of coordination, the carriers and the FBI
had created the Electronic Communications Service Provider
Committee through which the phone companies met with law
enforcement representatives on a regular basis to develop solutions
to current problems.15° It was soon recognized, however, that
some legislation was necessary because participation in the
Committee had been voluntary and its recommendations unen-
forceable.
B. Business and Economic Considerations
1. Encouraging Weak or Suspect Encryption is
Counter-Productive. -Any regulation of technology must take into
consideration the underlying economic effects. It is vital to
American business that cheap, powerful encryption be available to
149. See The Threat of Foreign Economic Espionage, supra note 1, at 191 (statement of
Geoffrey E. Turner, Senior Consultant, Information Security Program, SRI).
150. COMMrrTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 17, at 16-17.
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enable society to reap the fruits of electronic commerce and the
world economy. Encryption is an indispensable tool for business
information security. Trusted encryption serves the vital interest of
American business in protecting the confidentiality of information
within an international business environment.15 1  In this environ-
ment, information technology requires the transmission of sensitive
information across communication lines with significant risk of
interception and exploitation by foreign national intelligence
agencies, competitors and hackers.
The use of wireless and other shared communication channels
is increasing the susceptibility of large amounts of information to
interception by unintended users.'52 Satellites are being utilized
more often; as a consequence, inexpensive dishes can be used to
spy on billions of words a day. The internet also uses distributed
communication and switching. The General Accounting Office has
determined that United States industry has lost billions of dollars
through theft of commercial secrets and intellectual property.
153
The bottom line is that the government should not burden, via the
Clipper chip initiative or otherwise, an individual ability to obtain
powerful encryption for legitimate purposes.
2. Export Controls on Encryption are Hurting American
Industry.-Current export controls on encryption similarly disregard
the prevalence of encryption worldwide. Given the desire to
remain competitive in the world marketplace, industry leaders
believe that the government is misguided in its attempt to prevent
the inevitable progress of encryption technology. Basic economics
instructs one to make decisions on the margin. The reality is that
there is a great demand for powerful encryption and it is already
available worldwide.154
151. Documented theft has been committed by competitors, foreign governments,
employees and more. See, e.g., The Threat of Foreign Economic Espionage, supra note 1,
at 130 (statement of Marshall C. Phelps, Jr., IBM Corp.).
152. See Export Controls, supra note 75, at 128 n.2 (statement of Martin E. Heilman,
Implications of Encryption Policy on the National Information Infrastructure).
153. The Threat of Foreign Economic Espionage, supra note 1, at 1 (statement of
Representative Jack Brooks).
154. Indeed, the existing export controls are not completely effective. Many companies
are either unaware of the export controls or are unaware that ordinary software and
hardware has been embedded with encryption capabilities. Id. at 197 (statement of Geoffrey
E. Turner, Senior Consultant, Information Security Program, SRI).
1996]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
Thus, export controls simply give a huge advantage to foreign
software companies selling encryption products. The controls do
not keep encryption out of the hands of foreign criminals; rather,
they only guarantee that the encryption products will be provided
by foreign competitors. Because American products embedded
with encryption are restricted from full competition in the interna-
tional markets, current policies will likely result in a loss of
competitiveness in the information technology market for American
businesses. Current export controls put U.S. electronic and
computer manufacturers at a significant competitive disadvantage
to manufacturers overseas.'55
A new era is upon the United States. New threats of global
competition in trade and finance are now as important as military
ones. As "foreign governments shift their enormous espionage
resources away from military and political targets to world
commerce, sensitive business information is at greater risk."'56
The government needs to reconceive the needs of national security
to include not only traditional military and intelligence exigencies
but also the protection of our economic position.
C. Privacy and the Dangers of Impeding Technology
For a number of years, Congress has been acutely aware of the
public's desire to shield personal information about themselves
from others. As a result, Congress has expanded legal protections
for privacy rights. 57 Given the immense risks to privacy associa-
ted with electronic crime, any restriction on the legitimate use of
domestic encryption would, on the whole, do more harm to
American citizens than any advantage likely to be gained by law
enforcement. Congress has implicitly recognized such privacy
concerns. Today, a software manufacturer may include any
encryption program on software sold within the United States.
158
For the administration to indirectly do that which Congress has
rightly refused is not good policy and ultimately counter-productive.
In pushing the Clipper chip initiative, the administration was out of
touch with the technical realities of encryption.
155. Id. at 189 (statement of Geoffrey E. Turner, Senior Consultant, Information Security
Program, SRI).
156. Id. at 1 (statement of Representative Jack Brooks).
157. Leahy, supra note 2, at 3.
158. Browning, supra note 80, at 2063.
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The Clipper chip initiative creates an enormous new problem
of guarding the trap door that is created by the initiative. Acces-
sing the trap door would be the most valuable single secret in the
world.'59 A large corporation, a foreign country or a crime
syndicate with sufficient resources could attack and potentially
break any government standard. If the cryptographic standards set
by government are such that intelligence and law enforcement
agencies can defeat them, then surely implementing these standards
make the systems vulnerable to foreign intelligence agencies
targeting them in economic espionage. Experts currently estimate
that DES can be cracked for $1 million in 3.5 hours with a special
purpose machine; for $100 million you can break DES in 2
minutes.' 6° It is clear not only that DES will soon be dead but
also that any given encryption technique will soon become obsolete.
Therefore, any attempt to promote a fixed safeguard technology is
ill-fated.
VI. Concluding Remarks: Technical Merits & Procedural
Common Sense
There is little doubt that encryption poses incredible problems
for law enforcement. A workable solution is very difficult to
comprehend. Given the impossibility of keeping powerful
encryption out of the hands of terrorists, organized crime and other
bad actors, there may be no prophylactic action in which the
government can engage. Rather, it may be more helpful to think
about sentencing enhancements for crimes committed in conjunc-
tion with encryption use. Because the danger is so immense, it may
be appropriate to make the criminal use of encryption a serious
felony, and, perhaps, severe civil sanctions would be appropriate as
well.
Of course, this may not help much in deterring some terrorism,
but it may be the best that we can do given the state of our current
technological abilities. Given the incredible risks to computer
databases and transmissions by unauthorized interception, it is
critical to allow private parties to use state-of-the-art encryption for
legitimate purposes. Indeed, the burgeoning of technological
advancements that makes electronic surveillance more difficult has
159. The Threat of Foreign Economic Espionage, supra note 1, at 264-65 (statement of
Dr. Nathan P. Myhrvold, Microsoft Corp.).
160. Export Controls, supra note 75, at 22 (testimony of Philip Zimmerman).
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to some degree been a response to privacy concerns where the law
has not done its job. 61  The danger in the use of a master key
system like Clipper is that it can be subject to a foreign power's
mathematical attack or normal espionage which could result in a
"digital Pearl Harbor."
162
The Digital Telephony Bill, on the other hand, was a well-craf-
ted piece of legislation which accomplishes what was within the
electronic communications service providers' power. To this extent,
law enforcement will be able to more easily obtain the plain text of
voice or electronic communications after an appropriate warrant is
issued. The key to the success of the Digital Telephony Bill is that
it allows industry to develop standards to implement these
requirements.
For future technological regulation to be successful it must
take the regulated actors into consideration. These are the
individuals who have the necessary expertise to help craft sensible
solutions to future law enforcement problems when economic,
privacy and other values are in conflict. This is becoming evident
to some extent. For example, the Clinton administration began
working more closely and openly with industry at the "Key Escrow
Encryption Workshop" held on June 10, 1994.163 This workshop
was attended by representatives of the computer industry as well
as government and academia." Subsequently, Vice President
Gore sent Representative Cantwell the policy letter announcing a
"new phase" of cooperation among government, industry and
privacy advocates.
165
In line with this theme that inclusiveness is desirable, action
should be taken by Congress in areas of technology that implicate
fundamental personal and economic values. When Congress
deliberates over policy, it is a relatively public event. When issues
161. See Meyer, supra note 38, at 443-47 (discussing possible strategies for users of radio
technology to elude unlawful eavesdroppers).
162. The Threat of Foreign Economic Espionage, supra note 1, at 319 (statement of Dr.
Nathan P. Myhrvold, Microsoft Corp.).
163. OTA-TCT-606, supra note 6, at 15-16.
164. In fact, the idea of escrowed secret keys is not necessarily dead in the water. One
influential cryptographer has not eliminated the technical feasibility of escrowed secret keys,
wherein each user is legally required to deposit his secret key with a third party (like his
bank). The Threat of Foreign Economic Espionage, supra note 1, at 217 (statement of Dr.
Ronald L. Rivest, Professor of Computer Science, MIT). This was meant to show that "weak
cryptography" is not the only possible solution.
165. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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around important questions of technology regulation are raised,
ample public visibility that makes decision-makers accountable is
needed.
Although technology debates involve many intricacies, most of
the core debates revolve around the role of government. Tension
between different policy objectives lies at the center of the
encryption debate. The government is a developer, user and
regulator of safeguard technologies. The various roles of govern-
ment can and do conflict. What Congress can do is provide a
democratic framework for resolving debates about how to regulate
technology in a way that takes important, competing interests of
society into account. It is certainly appropriate for the government
to use its power to effect policy and its budget powers to stimulate
research and development or to establish new institutions and
standards. When it does take action, however, the government
must be open to debate and consultation with the appropriate, and
generally well-intentioned, technology experts outside of govern-
ment.

